We provide cross-country evidence to examine how financial market development affects innovation. Using a large data set including 34 developed as well as emerging countries, we differentiate the impacts of equity market and credit market development on a country's innovation productivity measured by patenting. Our baseline results show that, while the development of equity markets encourages innovation, credit market development impedes innovation. A rich set of tests shows that the baseline results are robust to endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. We further examine the effect of financial development on innovation making use of cross-sectional heterogeneity in countries' investor protections, economic development degrees, and legal system origins. We find that the effect of financial development on innovation is more pronounced in emerging countries and in countries with stronger shareholder protection, weaker creditor protection, and English common law origin. Our evidence is robust to alternative proxies for financial development and innovation. JEL Classifications: G15; O30; R11
Introduction
Innovation is vital for a country's long-run economic growth and competitive advantage.
As suggested in Porter (1992) , "To compete effectively in international markets, a nation's businesses must continuously innovate and upgrade their competitive advantages. Innovation and upgrading come from sustained investment in physical as well as intangible assets." Financial markets play critical roles in mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions. Therefore the development of financial markets is critical for a nation's innovation (Schumpeter, 1911) . Although there is a large economics and finance literature establishing a strong link between financial development and economic growth, empirical studies of channels through which finance affects growth is relative sparse. The objective of this paper is to fill the gap by identifying a channel, i.e., innovation, and providing cross-country evidence to empirically examine the impact of financial development on innovation. Furthermore, we differentiate the impacts of equity market and credit market development on innovation.
Our basic hypothesis is that credit market and equity market development have different impacts on innovation. As pointed out by Holmstrom (1989) , innovation activities involve a very high probability of failure and the whole innovation process is long, idiosyncratic, and unpredictable with many future contingencies that are hard to foresee. Therefore, different natures of credit and equity markets have different influences on encouraging innovation.
Specifically, we hypothesize that, while equity market development encourages innovation, credit market development impedes innovation.
As suggested by the existing literature, credit markets may discourage innovation. Stiglitz (1985) suggests that the structure of a debt contract is not well suited for innovative firms with uncertain and volatile returns. Hellwig (1991) and Rajan (1992) argue that powerful banks frequently stifle innovation by extracting informational rents and protecting established firms. By acquiring inside information about the firm, powerful banks can extract informational rents and a large share of the profits from firms, which reduces firms' incentives to undertake invest in longrun innovative projects. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) further suggest that credit markets have an inherent bias toward conservative investments, which discourages firms from investing in innovative projects and leads them to be more willing to shut down ongoing ones.
In contrast, equity markets give firms more discretion to invest in innovative technologies and therefore firms have stronger incentive to pursue uncertain but potentially breakthrough innovations. As suggested in Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) and Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2010) , equity markets have several advantages relative to credit markets when encouraging innovation. First, unlike bondholders, shareholders share in upside returns when innovation turns out to be successful. Second, unlike debt financing, there are no collateral requirements for equity financing, which is especially valuable for innovative firms because these firms typically have large intangible assets with limited collateral value. Third, firms' exposures to financial distress do not increase with additional equity financing, which is valuable for firms investing in innovations.
We collect innovation and financial development data for 34 economies from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Patent Report, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (WDI/GDF) databases. Our sample includes both developed countries such as U.S., U.K., and Japan and emerging nations like China, India, and Brazil. To address concerns regarding endogeneity in financial development and short panel data with auto-correlated variables, we use the ArellanoBond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure in our baseline estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998) .
Our baseline analysis suggests that a nation's equity market development (measured by the nation's stock market capitalization normalized by GDP) is positively and significantly associated with its subsequent growth in innovation productivity. Specifically, increasing a country's stock market capitalization by one standard deviation increases its growth in innovation productivity (measured by the number of filed patents) by 3.01~5.78%. However, a country's credit market development (measured by its domestic credit to private sectors normalized by GDP) is negatively associated with its subsequent growth in innovation productivity. Our evidence suggests that increasing a nation's credit to private sectors by one standard deviation results in a decrease in its innovation productivity growth rate in the following year by 3.47~5.62%.
While our baseline results support the hypothesis that equity market development encourages innovation and credit market development impedes innovation, an important concern is endogeneity in financial development, which arises because of both reverse causality and omitted variables concerns. First, there is an old debate on the direction of causality between finance and growth (e.g., Schumpeter, 1911 and Robinson, 1952) . Although our evidence obtained from the Arellano-Bond GMM procedure seems to suggest that financial development leads to innovation, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the causality flowing goes from innovation to financial development. For example, one may argue that economies with good innovation prospects develop financial markets to provide the funds necessary to support those good innovation prospects. Then, innovation leads, and finance follows. Second, omitted variables problem may also bias our estimation. Unobservable industry/country characteristics that are related to both financial development and innovation growth are put in the residual term of the regressions, which biases the estimation and makes statistical inferences hard to draw.
Although including country fixed effects in our baseline regression can largely mitigate the omitted variables problem when unobservables are constant over time, endogeneity is still a concern if unobservables are time-varying.
To address the endogeneity concern, we take two different approaches. We start with Granger causality (Granger, 1969) to address the reverse causality problem. Granger causality is an empirical approach to investigate causal effects between time series and has been widely studied and applied in macroeconomics. We find financial development Granger-cause innovation, because a previous increase in financial development is associated with a subsequent increase in innovation but a previous change in innovation is not associated with subsequent change in financial development. Since the concerns and caveats of Granger causality are well understood, we further address the endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable (IV) approach. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Beck and Levine (2002) , we use the legal origin and the religious composition of countries as the IVs for the level of financial development. The first-stage regressions of the two-stage least squares (TSLS) regression suggest that the IVs are statistically significantly related to financial development variables and therefore satisfy the relevance condition. In the second-stage regressions, our baseline results continue to hold, suggesting that the relation between financial development and innovation cannot be simply attributed to omitted variables. The evidence from the two approaches addressing endogeneity issues suggests that there exists a causal effect of financial development on innovation.
We then further examine the impact of financial development on innovation relying on the cross-sectional heterogeneity in countries' investor protections, economic development degrees, and legal system origins. First, we find that the positive impact of equity market development on innovation is stronger in countries with higher shareholder protection and the negative impact of credit market development on innovation is stronger in countries with weaker creditor protection. Our evidence suggests that stronger protection for investors mitigates the agency problem between firm managers and investors, which encourages innovation. Second, we show that the positive (negative) impact of equity (credit) market development on innovation is stronger in emerging countries than developed countries. Our evidence suggests that relative to developed countries, equity markets play a leading role fostering innovation in emerging countries due to insufficiency and inefficiency of these countries' private sector's technology investment. Meanwhile, since the development of credit markets in emerging nations to some extent reflects the risk aversion of these countries' investors, a more developed credit market discourages risky investments in innovation to a greater degree. Finally, we find that the positive (negative) impact of equity (credit) market development on innovation is stronger in Common law countries than in Civil law countries. The evidence is consistent with our earlier findings based on cross-country investor protections.
We check the robustness of our findings by constricting alternative proxies and alternative samples. First, we construct alternative proxies for financial development as well as innovation. Our baseline results remain unchanged. Second, in addition to our baseline setup that is based on industry-country-year observations, we redo all analyses in an alternative sample that is based on country-year observations. The sample size is substantially smaller (which largely reduces the power of our tests), but we find both quantitatively and qualitatively similar results.
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, our paper contributes to the literature on motivating innovation. There is a fast growing literature, both theoretically and empirically, examining how to promote innovation. Holmstrom (1989) , in a simple principleagent model, shows that innovation activities may mix poorly with routine activities in an organization. Manso (2009) develops a model and argues that managerial contracts that provide tolerance for failure in the short run and reward for success in the long run are best suited for motivating innovation. The model in Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2010) shows that private instead of public ownership spurs innovation. Empirical evidence using U.S. data shows that laws (Fan and White, 2003; Armour and Cumming, 2008; and Acharya and Subramanian, 2009 ), corporate governance (Sapra, Subramanian, and Chemmanur and , capital structure (Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru, 2007) , stock liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 2010) , product market competition (Aghion et al., 2005) , investors' attitude towards failure (Tian and Wang, 2010) , and institutional ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2009) all affect innovation.
The only paper we are aware of that examines the determinants of firm innovation using international data is Ayyagari, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010) . Using manager survey data from 47 emerging countries, they show that more innovative firms are large exporting firms characterized by private ownership, highly educated managers with mid-level managerial experience, and access to external finance. Unlike their paper that focuses on emerging countries and uses firm-level survey data, our paper uses data including both emerging and developed countries and studies the different impacts of equity and credit market development on innovation at the aggregate level. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper that shows while the development of equity market encourages innovation, credit market development restrains innovation in an international setting.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on finance and growth. Starting from Schumpeter (1911) and Robinson (1952) , a large literature has been developed to understand the relationship between financial systems and growth. Recent theoretical developments have indicated two likely linkages between finance and growth. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and Jappelli and Pagano (1993) argue that financial markets can matter by affecting the volume of savings available to financial investment, while Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and King and Levine (1993a) suggest that financial markets matter by increasing the productivity of investment. Following above theoretical work, empirical evidence linking finance and growth goes back to Goldsmith (1969) , McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) . More recently, research has shown that the size and depth of an economy's financial system positively affects its future growth in per capital, real income, employment, and output (e.g., King and Levine, 1993b; Jayarathe and Strahan, 1996; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002; and Black and Strahan, 2002) . Our contribution to this literature is that we identify a specific channel, i.e., innovation, through which finance affects economic growth.
The closest related paper in this stream of literature to ours is Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) . They argue that the financing of R&D is a channel that links finance and growth, and show significant effects of cash flow and external equity on R&D for young, but not mature firms. Our paper differs from theirs in a couple of dimensions. First, we directly examine the effect of financial development on patents that reflect successful and realized R&D investments. Second, instead of using U.S. firm level data, we rely on cross-country aggregate level data that allows us to differentiate the impacts of credit and equity market development on innovation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss data collection, variable construction, and provide descriptive statistics. Section 3 reports our empirical results and discusses the main findings. Section 4 shows cross-sectional analysis, and Section 5 concludes this paper. Detailed discussions on variable definitions and dynamic panel data model estimation are given in the appendix.
Data
We construct our main innovation measure based on the number of patents approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). We measure the innovation growth of industry j in country i in year t as follows:
where Patent j,i,t measures the number of granted patents in industry j from country i in year t. We use the patent data of the USPTO for two reasons: First, due to the territorial principle in U.S. patent laws, any person intending to claim exclusive rights for inventions is required to file U.S.
patents. Since the U.S. is the biggest technology consumption market in the world over the past few decades, it is reasonable to assume that all important inventions from other countries have been patented in the U.S. Second, the USPTO adopts a reasonably detailed classification system, For robustness, we also construct a country-level proxy to measure the innovation growth of country i in year t as follows:
These patents are successful innovation as they are later granted by the USPTO. That database contains detailed information of all patents approved by the USPTO over the period .
where Some issues about our proxies of innovation are worth discussing: First, using U.S. patent data to measure cross-country innovation performance has been widely adopted in the literature (e.g., Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 1999; Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt, 2005; Griffith, Harrison, and Van Reenen, 2006; and Acharya and Subramanian, 2009 In the existing literature, a country's overall financial development is measured by the ratio of domestic credit plus stock market capitalization to GDP (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . Since our goal is to understand how stock market development and credit market development differently influence a country's innovation productivity, we construct two separate empirical proxies. Following the existing literature (e.g., Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002; and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007) , the proxy for stock market development of country i in year t is
i.e. the natural logarithmic ratio of country i's stock market capitalization in year t over its GDP in the same year. The proxy for credit market development of country i in year t is
i.e. the natural logarithmic ratio of country i's domestic credit to private sectors in year t over its GDP in the same year. Domestic credit to private sectors includes domestic credit through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable. For robustness, we also consider the natural logarithmic ratio of all bank credits to GDP as an alternative proxy for credit market development. Since the alternative proxy provides test results similar to that of the primary one, it is omitted in the context in the interest of brevity.
We also include other economic variables that may affect innovation growth in our empirical analysis: (1) 
Empirical analysis
In this section, we present our empirical tests and discuss the main findings of the paper.
We start with discussing model specification and estimation in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we present our baseline results. In Section 3.3, we discuss our identification strategy and present empirical tests dealing with endogeneity concerns. We show robustness check results with alternative proxies for innovation growth in Section 3.4.
Model specification and estimation
To investigate the effect of financial development on country-industry-level innovation growth, we estimate the following model:
where ∆IndustryTech j,i,t-1 is the lagged value of ∆IndustryTech j,i,t , Industry j denotes industry dummies, Country i denotes country dummies, Year t denotes year dummies, and all other country-level economic variables are the same as we describe in Section 2 before.
For robustness, we estimate the following model to examine the effect of financial development on country-level innovation growth:
where ∆CountryTech i,t-1 is the lagged value of ∆CountryTech i,t , and all other economic variables are the same as those in Equation (5).
It is well known that the traditional least squares dummy variable (LSDV) method is biased in the above dynamic panel data models with individual effects. To address this potential bias, we adopt the Arellano-Bond GMM procedure following Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) for two panels: the industry-country-year panel (Equation (5)) and the country-year panel (Equation (6)). The individual country-industry effect is present in the former panel, while the individual country effect is present in the latter panel. The dynamic panel is estimated using the one-step GMM system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998) , which employs two moment conditions to jointly estimate the regressions in transforms of the variables and regressions in levels. Following the existing literature (e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; and Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000) , we use the past three available lagged regressors as instruments in "transformed regressions" and one lagged transforms of regressors in "level regressions." Detailed procedures of dynamic panel data model estimation are discussed in Appendix B. Table 2 reports the GMM system estimation results of estimating Equations (5) and (6) respectively, in the basic model setting (column (1)), in which we include only lagged innovation, stock market development, credit market development, industry dummies, country dummies, and year dummies in the regression. The results suggest that increasing a country's stock market capitalization by one standard deviation increases its innovation growth by 3.01%, while increasing its credit to private sector by one standard deviation decreases its innovation growth by 3.47%.
Baseline results
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As reported in Panel A of Table 2 , we also show that R&D growth, GDP growth, and liquidity liability are positively related to the country's innovation growth, which are consistent with economic intuition and existing literature. In addition, economic openness and freedom also positively related to the country's innovation growth. Lagged innovation does not appear to explain future innovation once other variables are controlled. Our sample size varies across different model specifications due to the availability of explanatory variables included in the regressions.
In the second specification, we add R&D growth, stock market turnover, and GDP growth to the regression. Although the estimations are based on a much smaller sample, which may substantially reduce the power of our tests, the magnitudes and significance levels of coefficient estimates of MKT i,t
and CREDIT i,t closely mirror those of our baseline regressions reported in Panel A.
7 As reported in Table 1 , the standard deviations of MKT and CREDIT are 1.204 and 0.694, respectively. Thus, the one standard deviation increase in MKT and CREDIT leads to 1.204×2.5% = 3.01% and 0.694×-5.0% = -3.47% in innovation, respectively. Consistent with our earlier findings, R&D growth, GDP growth, and liquidity liability are positively related to the country's innovation growth. Moreover, stock market turnover is positively related to future innovation, while economic openness and freedom do not appear to explain innovation growth. The negative coefficient estimates of lagged innovation growth confirm the mean-reverting process in technology progress as we show in Table 1 . Due to the availability of explanatory variables, the sample size varies across different specifications.
Identification
While our baseline results support the hypothesis that equity market development encourages innovation and credit market development impedes innovation, an important concern is endogeneity in financial development. The endogeneity concern arises mainly due to both reverse causality and omitted variables problem. In this section, we take two different approaches to address the identification issue.
Granger causality
We start with addressing the revisers causality problem. As we discussed in the introduction, there is an old debate on the direction of causality between finance and growth (e.g., Schumpeter, 1911 and Robinson, 1952) . Although the Arellano-Bond GMM procedure takes endogeneity in financial development into account by using lagged regressors as instruments, we still cannot completely rule out the possibility that innovation drives up contemporaneous financial development as well as future innovation, which results in a lead-lag relation between financial development and innovation. Such argument, however, is not supported by our data because both ∆IndustryTech and ∆CountryTech are negatively autocorrelated as reported in Table 1 .
Another possible reverse-causality situation is that economies with good innovation prospects develop financial markets to provide the funds necessary to support those good innovation prospects. Then, innovation leads, and finance follows. To address the reverse causality, we first use Granger causality (Granger, 1969) by estimating the following models for the country-year panel: 
where e i,t and ε i,t denote the error terms.
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We report the regression results in Taken together, the Granger causality tests suggest that a previous increase in financial development is associated with a subsequent increase in innovation, but a previous change in innovation is not associated with subsequent change in financial development. Our evidence hence suggests that financial development Granger-causes innovation.
Instrumental variable approach
Endogeneity in financial development may also due to the omitted variables problem.
Unobservable characteristics that affect both financial development and innovation may bias our coefficient estimates and, which makes the interpretation of our results difficult. Although we include country fixed effects in our baseline regressions that largely mitigate the omitted The first set of instruments is a country's legal origin. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Vishny (1997, 1998) show that a country's legal system (English, French, German, or Scandinavian system) influences its domestic capital market development. Therefore, it satisfies the relevance condition of IVs. Moreover, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Beck and Levine (2002) (3)), being consistent with our baseline findings that credit market development impedes innovation. The insignificant Sargan-Hansen J-statistics for the validity of the IVs in columns (2) and (3) suggests that our instruments are reasonably valid. Overall, the TSLS regression results reported in Table 4 suggest that the effect of financial market development on innovation is unlikely driven by unobservable country or industry heterogeneity.
In summary, the identification tests reported in this subsection reasonably suggest that our baseline results are robust to endogeneity in financial development, and there exists a casual relationship between equity and credit market development and innovation growth.
Alternative proxies for innovation
For robustness, in addition to alternative sample, we construct two alternative proxies for innovation growth: the growth in high-tech exports and the growth of scientific and technical journal articles. We then examine the effects of financial development on innovation growth measured by these two proxies. The growth in high-tech exports of country i in year t is constructed as follows:
where HiTechExport i,t is the current US dollars of high-tech exports, including exporting high R&D intensity products such as aerospace-related, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery in country i in year t. The growth in scientific and technical journal articles of country i in year t is defined as follows:
where Article i,t refers to the number of scientific and technical journal articles in physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth and space sciences from the authors of country i in year t. We obtain the data about high-tech exports and scientific and technical journal articles from the WDI/GDF database that covers a sample period from 1986 to 2006.
In Table 5 , we report the estimation results of the following models: (1), and the coefficient estimates ofCREDIT i,t-1 are all negate. Overall, our evidence shows that the effect of financial development on innovation is reasonably robust to alternative proxies of innovation.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this section, we further examine the effect of financial development on innovation by making use of cross-sectional heterogeneity in countries' investor protections, economic development degrees, and legal system origins. We discuss how we partition the sample for cross-sectional analysis in more details in Appendix C. We report the cross-sectional analysis results based on our baseline industry-country sample in Table 6 and the cross-sectional analysis results based on the country-level sample in Table 7 .
First, we hypothesize that the principal-agent problem may affect the impact of equity market development on innovation. This is because public firms' R&D investment could be inefficient or even irrational due to inappropriate internal control or irrational managerial optimism (Jensen, 1993; Hall, 1993) . Therefore, we expect that the marginal impact of equity market development on innovation is stronger in countries where shareholder protection is stronger. To test the hypothesis, we partition our sample countries into high shareholder protection (High SP) group and low shareholder protection (Low SP) group based on each country's anti-director rights following Djankov, LaPorta, Lopes-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and Spamann (2010). We run the baseline regression separately in these two groups of countries and report the results in the Panel A of Table 6 . For brevity, we report only the baseline specification with lagged innovation, stock market development, credit market development, industry dummies, country dummies, and year dummies. However, including other economic variables used in Table 2 does not substantially change our results.
The coefficient estimate of MKT i,t-1 is 0.067 and significant at the 1% level in the high SP countries and that of MKT i,t-1 is 0.011 but statistically insignificant in the low SP countries, Our evidence suggests that the positive effect of stock market development on innovation is stronger in the countries with better shareholder protection. The evidence is consistent with the intuition that shareholders are more confident at innovation investment when they are better protected, and therefore the impact of equity market development on innovation is stronger in countries with stronger shareholder protection.
Based on the similar rationale, we hypothesize that stronger credit rights may make creditors less concerned about their investment and wealth and hence mitigate the negative impact of credit market development on innovation. To test this hypothesis, we divide our sample countries into high creditor protection (High CP) group and low creditor protection (Low CP) group based on each country's creditor rights, following Djankov, Mcliesh, and Shleifer (2007) . We run the baseline regression separately in these two groups of samples and report the results in Panel B of Table 6 .
The coefficient estimates of CREDIT i,t-1 is negative but not statistically significant in countries with high creditor rights, but that of CREDIT i,t-1 is negative and significant at the 1% level for the subsample of countries with low creditor rights. Specifically, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of CREDIT i,t-1 for countries with low creditor rights is much larger than that of CREDIT i,t-1 for countries with high creditor rights, i.e., -0.204 versus -0.026. Overall, the cross-sectional analysis evidence reported above is consistent with the hypothesis that stronger shareholder protection magnifies the positive impact of equity market development on innovation, while stronger creditor rights mitigates the negative impact of credit market development on innovation.
The third cross-sectional analysis is based on a country's economic development. Our conjecture is that relative to developed countries, emerging nations may have insufficient capital and inefficient investment in its private sector's technology development. Therefore, the impact of equity market development on innovation is stronger in emerging countries. Meanwhile, unlike developed economies, the development of credit markets in emerging nations may to some extent reflect the risk aversion of these countries' investors. Therefore, a more developed credit market may discourage risky investment innovation to a greater degree. Hence, the negative impact of credit market development on innovation could be stronger in emerging countries. Following McLean, Pontiff, and Watanabe (2009), we classify our sample countries into developed and emerging nations. We run the baseline regressions separately in these two subsamples and report the regression results in Panel C of and -0.160 (t-statistic = -3.33) in developed and emerging countries, respectively, suggesting that the negative effect of credit market development on innovation is more pronounced in emerging countries. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that credit market development to some extent reflects general risk aversion of investors in emerging countries.
When investors are more risk averse, a more developed credit market tends to discourage risky and idiosyncratic investment (e.g., innovation) to a greater degree.
Finally, we make use of the cross-sectional heterogeneity in countries' legal systems to further examine the effect of financial development on innovation. Starting from La Porta,
Loper-de-Silances, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and followed by many other studies, legal systems have been shown to affect various aspects of a country's economy. We classify our sample countries into two groups of legal origins: English common and French civil. We report regression results in Panel D of Table 6 . The coefficient estimates of MKT i,t-1 are all positive but only significant in the subsample of English common group. The evidence is consistent with our earlier findings that the positive effect of credit market development on innovation is more pronounced in countries where shareholder rights are better protected. The coefficient estimates of CREDIT i,t-1 are negative and significant at the 1% level in English common group but turns to be positive and significant at the 5% level in French civil group. It is thought-provoking to observe that credit market development actually promotes innovation in countries with French civil legal origin, suggesting that credit market development, unlike in countries with English common legal origin, do not necessarily impedes innovation when it is guided by governments to a greater extent. The evidence also seems to support the influential role of social capitalism in national science and technology development.
For robustness, we redo the cross-sectional analyses based on our country-level sample and report the regression results in Table 7 . The structure of Table 7 closely mirrors that of Table   6 . Panel D, we split our country-level sample based on the legal origins of countries. Our suggestive evidence shows that the effect of financial development on innovation is stronger in English common legal origin than in French civil legal origin, although the power of the tests is dramatically reduced due to very small sample size.
Overall, our results collectively suggest the cross-sectional findings as follows. First, the positive effect of equity market development on innovation is stronger in countries with better shareholder protection, as better protected shareholders are more willing to invest in high-riskhigh-return innovation. Second, the negative effect of credit market development on innovation is stronger in countries with weaker creditor protection, as creditors are more concerned with the risk accompanying innovation in these countries. Third, the positive (negative) effect of equity (credit) market development on innovation is more pronounced in emerging countries, suggesting that prevailing under-investment and poor corporate governance in emerging countries are obstacles to technological development in these countries. Finally, the effect of financial development on innovation is stronger in English common law countries than in French civil law countries.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided, for the first time in the literature, cross-country evidence that examines how financial market development affects innovation. Making use of a large data set that includes 34 developed as well as emerging countries between 1976 and 2006, we report the different impacts of equity market and credit market development on a country's innovation growth measured by patenting. Our baseline results suggest that, while the development of equity markets encourages innovation, credit market development impedes innovation. We conduct a rich set of identification tests and show that our baseline results are robust to endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. We further examine the effect of financial development on innovation relying on cross-sectional heterogeneity in countries' investor protections, economic development degrees, and legal system origins. Our cross-sectional analyses suggest that the effect of financial development on innovation is more pronounced in emerging countries and in countries with stronger shareholder protection, weaker creditor protection, and English common law origin. Our findings are robust to alternative measures for innovation, such as high-tech exports and scientific and technical journal articles, and alternative measures for financial development. transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. The data are from the WDI/GDF database.
6. Freedom i,t : A score for country i's overall economic freedom score in year t, defined as a simple average of its scores on ten individual freedom indexes in year t: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. These indexes are constructed by the Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation.
B. Details of dynamic panel data model estimation
Our dynamic panel regression model can be written as
, where y i,t denotes left-hand-side dependent variable, x i,t-1 denotes explanatory variables (our basic specification includes 
When the time dimension of the panel data T is small the biases will be very large regardless of the number of cross-sections.
To address this issue, the Arellano-Bover GMM system estimation jointly estimates the regressions in differences (or deviations) and regressions in levels with all the available instruments. Arellano and Bover (1995) propose to use the lagged levels of dependent variables in the transformed regressions. For example, in the first differences, the moment conditions are:
They call the y i,t as "GMM-type instruments". They also propose to use lagged differences of dependent variables in the levels regressions:
, where = t i u , λ t + η i + v i,t , and they call ∆y i,t as "GMM-level instruments". Blundell and Bond (1998) show that GMM system estimator outperforms GMM estimator especially when the endogenous variables are persistent (which is especially true for MKT and CREDIT). In this study we use two to four period lags as instrument in transformation regressions and last period lag in the level regressions, and one-step robust standard errors to draw inferences. The upper panel reports the summary statistics of all variables, while the lower panel reports their correlation coefficients. ∆IndustryT echj,i,t is the measure of technological growth of industry j in country i in year t and is defined as ∆IndustryT echj,i,t = ln(1 + P atentj,i,t) − ln(1 + P atentj,i,t−1), where P atentj,i,t denotes the number of patents in the j-th class of 3-digit patent classes filed by the residents of country i in year t. ∆CountryT echi,t is the measure of technological growth of country i in year t and is defined as ∆CountryT echi,t = ln(1+P atenti,t)− ln(1+P atenti,t−1), where P atenti,t denotes the number of country i residents' worldwide patent applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or with country i's national patent office in year t. M KTi,t is the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, i.e. ln(M arket Capi,t/GDPi,t). CREDITi,t is the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, i.e. ln(P rivate Crediti,t/GDPi,t). DeltaR&Di,t is the logarithmic number of country i's aggregate R&D expenditure in year t minus its aggregate R&D expenditure in year t − 1, i.e. ln(R&Di,t) −ln(R&Di,t−1). T urnoveri,t: the logarithmic ratio of country i's stock market traded value over its stock market capitalization in year t. ∆GDPi,t is country i's logarithmic GDP in year t minus its GDP in year t − 1. Opennessi,t is a measure for the economic openness based on export and import, defined as the logarithmic ratio of country i's import plus export over its GDP in year t, i.e. ln[(importi,t + exporti,t)/GDPi,t]. M 3i,t is a measure of money supply, defined as country i's M3 over its GDP in year t, i.e., ln(M 3i,t/GDPi,t). F reedomi,t is the score for country i's overall economic freedom score in year t, defined as a simple average of its scores on ten individual freedom indexes in year t: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. The data of P atentj,i,t are from the updated NBER patent database that contains the details information of all U.S. patents. The data of P atenti,t are from the World Intellectual Property Organization ( This table reports the GMM system estimation results. Panel A estimates the following model: ∆IndustryT echj,i,t = α +β0∆IndustryT echj,i,t−1 + β1M KTi,t−1 + β2CREDITi,t−1 + β3∆R&Di,t−1+β4T urnoveri,t−1 + β5∆GDPi,t−1 + β6Opennessi,t−1 + β7M 3i,t−1 + β8F reedomi,t−1+Industryj + Countryi + Y eart + νj,i,t. Panel B estimates the following model: ∆CountryT echi,t = α + β0∆CountryT echi,t−1 + β1M KTi,t−1 +β2CREDITi,t−1 + β3∆R&Di,t−1 +β4T urnoveri,t−1+β5∆GDPi,t−1+β6Opennessi,t−1+β7M 3i,t−1 +β8F reedomi,t−1+Countryi+Y eart+νi,t. M KTi,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, CREDITi,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, ∆R&Di,t−1 denotes the difference in logarithmic aggregate R&D expenditure, T urnoveri,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market traded value over stock market capitalization, ∆GDPi,t−1 denotes the difference in logarithmic GDP, Opennessi,t−1 measures the economic openness and is defined as the logarithmic ratio of the sum of import and export over GDP, M 3i,t−1 is logarithmic ratio of money supply (M3) over GDP, F reedomi,t−1 describes the economic freedom of the country, Industryj denotes industry dummies, Countryi denotes country dummies, Y eart denotes year dummies, and νj,i,t denotes the error term. We use one-step estimators and robust standard errors to draw statistical inferences. This table reports the GMM system estimation results. Panel A estimates the following model: M KTi,t = α + β0∆CountryT echi,t−1 + β1M KTi,t−1 +β2CREDITi,t−1 + β3∆R&Di,t−1 +β4T urnoveri,t−1 + β5∆GDPi,t−1 + β6Opennessi,t−1 + β7M 3i,t−1 +β8F reedomi,t−1 + Countryi + Y eart + νi,t. Panel B estimates the following model: CREDITi,t = α + β0∆CountryT echi,t−1 + β1M KTi,t−1 +β2CREDITi,t−1 + β3∆R&Di,t−1 +β4T urnoveri,t−1 + β5∆GDPi,t−1 + β6Opennessi,t−1 + β7M 3i,t−1 +β8F reedomi,t−1 + Countryi + Y eart + νi,t. M KT denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, CREDIT denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, ∆R&D denotes the difference in logarithmic aggregate R&D expenditure, T urnover denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market traded value over stock market capitalization, ∆GDP denotes the difference in logarithmic GDP, Openness measures the economic openness and is defined as the logarithmic ratio of the sum of import and export over GDP, M 3 is logarithmic ratio of money supply (M3) over GDP, F reedom describes the economic freedom of the country, Countryi denotes country dummies, Y eart denotes year dummies, and νj,i,t denotes the error term. We use one-step estimators and robust standard errors to draw statistical inferences. The sample period is 1985-2005. This table reports the GMM system estimation results. Panel A estimates the following model: ∆HiT echExporti,t = α + β0∆HiT echExporti,t−1 + β1M KTi,t−1 +β2CREDITi,t−1 + β3∆R&Di,t−1 +β4T urnoveri,t−1 + β5∆GDPi,t−1 + β6Opennessi,t−1 + β7M 3i,t−1 +β8F reedomi,t−1 + Countryi + Y eart + νi,t. Panel B estimates the following model: ∆Articlei,t = α+β0∆Articlei,t−1 +β1M KTi,t−1 +β2CREDITi,t−1 +β3∆R&Di,t−1 +β4T urnoveri,t−1 +β5∆GDPi,t−1 + β6Opennessi,t−1 + β7M 3i,t−1 +β8F reedomi,t−1 + Countryi + Y eart + νi,t. HiT echExporti,t denotes the logarithmic growth of country i's high-tech export value in year t, while Articlei,t denotes the logarithmic growth in the number of country i's scientific and technical journal articles in year t. M KTi,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, CREDITi,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, ∆R&Di,t−1 denotes the difference in logarithmic aggregate R&D expenditure, T urnoveri,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market traded value over stock market capitalization, ∆GDPi,t−1 denotes the difference in logarithmic GDP, Opennessi,t−1 measures the economic openness and is defined as the logarithmic ratio of the sum of import and export over GDP, M 3i,t−1 is logarithmic ratio of money supply (M3) over GDP, F reedomi,t−1 describes the economic freedom of the country, Countryi denotes country dummies, Y eart denotes year dummies, and νj,i,t denotes the error term. We use one-step estimators and robust standard errors to draw statistical inferences. In Panel A, we divide all industry-country-year samples into two groups: High shareholder protection (High SP) and low shareholder protection (Low SP). In Panel B, we divide all samples into two groups: High creditor protection (High CP) and low creditor protection (Low CP). In Panel C, we divide all samples into two groups: Developed and emerging. In Panel D, we consider two groups by their legal systems: English common and French civil. Within each group, we estimate the following model: ∆IndustryT echj,i,t = α +β0∆IndustryT echj,i,t−1 +β1M KTi,t−1 + β2CREDITi,t−1 +Industryj + Countryi + Y eart +νj,i,t. M KTi,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, CREDITi,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, Industryj denotes industry dummies, Countryi denotes country dummies, Y eart denotes year dummies, and νj,i,t denotes the error term. We use one-step estimators and robust standard errors to draw statistical inferences. In Panel A, we divide all country-year samples into two groups: High shareholder protection (High SP) and low shareholder protection (Low SP). In Panel B, we divide all samples into two groups: High creditor protection (High CP) and low creditor protection (Low CP). In Panel C, we divide all samples into two groups: Developed and emerging. In Panel D, we consider two groups by their legal systems: English common and French civil. Within each group, we estimate the following model: ∆CountryT echi,t = α + β0∆CountryT echi,t−1 + β1M KTi,t−1 +β2CREDITi,t−1 +Countryi + Y eart + νi,t. The dependent variable is ∆CountryT echi,t. M KTi,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, CREDITi,t−1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, Countryi denotes country dummies, Y eart denotes year dummies, and νi,t denotes the error term. We use one-step estimators and robust standard errors to draw statistical inferences. 
